Arbiter assignment
Afacan, Mustafa Oguz Anbarci, Nejat Kibris, Ozgur
Afacan, Mustafa Oguz
Anbarci, Nejat
Kibris, Ozgur
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Undergraduate Program
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Journal article
Date
2025
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English
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Abstract
In dispute resolution, arbitrator assignments are decentralized and also incorporate parties’ preferences, in total contrast to referee assignments in sports. We suggest that there can be gains (i) in dispute resolution from centralizing the allocation by bundling the newly arriving cases, and (ii) in sports from incorporating teams’ preferences. To that end, we introduce a class of Arbiter Assignment Problems where a set of matches (e.g., disputes or games), each made up of two agents, are to be assigned arbiters (e.g., arbitrators or referees). On this domain, the question of how agents in a match should compromise becomes critical. To evaluate the value of an arbiter for a match, we introduce the (Rawlsian) notion of depth, defined as the arbiter’s worst position in the two agents’ rankings. depth-optimal assignments minimize depth over matches, and they are Pareto-optimal. We introduce and analyze depth-optimal (and fair) mechanisms.
Citation
M. O. Afacan, N. Anbarci, and O. Kıbrıs, “Arbiter assignment,” Social Choice and Welfare 2025, pp. 1–30, Sep. 2025, doi: 10.1007/S00355-025-01627-5
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Social Choice and Welfare
Conference
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Springer Nature