Opportunity-Cost-Driven Reward Mechanisms for Crowd-Sourced Computing Platforms
Zheng, Shuhao Xin, Ziyue Li, Zonglun Liu, Xue
Zheng, Shuhao
Xin, Ziyue
Li, Zonglun
Liu, Xue
Supervisor
Department
Machine Learning
Embargo End Date
Type
Conference proceeding
Date
2025
License
Language
English
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Journal Issue
Abstract
This paper introduces a game-theoretic model tailored for reward distribution on crowd-sourced computing platforms. It explores a repeated game framework where miners, as computation providers, decide their computation power contribution in each round, guided by the platform's designed reward distribution mechanism. The reward for each miner in every round is based on the platform's randomized task payments and the miners' computation transcripts. Specifically, it defines Opportunity-Cost-Driven Incentive Compatibility (OCD-IC) and Dynamic OCD-IC (DOCD-IC) for scenarios where strategic miners might allocate some computation power to more profitable activities, such as Bitcoin mining. The platform must also achieve Budget Balance (BB), aiming for a non-negative total income over the long term. This paper demonstrates that traditional Pay-Per-Share (PPS) reward schemes require assumptions about task demand and miners' opportunity costs to ensure OCD-IC and BB, yet they fail to satisfy DOCD-IC. The paper then introduces Pay-Per-Share with Subsidy (PPSS), a new reward mechanism that allows the platform to provide subsidies to miners, thus eliminating the need for assumptions on opportunity cost to achieve OCD-IC, DOCD-IC, and long-term BB.
Citation
S. Zheng, Z. Xin, Z. Li, and X. Liu, “Opportunity-Cost-Driven Reward Mechanisms for Crowd-Sourced Computing Platforms,” 2025 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, ICBC 2025, 2025, doi: 10.1109/ICBC64466.2025.11114463
Source
2025 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, ICBC
Conference
7th IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, ICBC 2025
Keywords
Crowd-sourced Computing, Incentive Compatibility, Opportunity Cost, Reward Mechanism, Budget Control, Computational Cost, Computer Games, Costs, Crowdsourcing, Game Theory, Integrated Circuits, Budget Balance, Computation Power, Computing Platform, Crowd-sourced Computing, Game Frameworks, Game-theoretic Model, Incentive Compatibility, Opportunity Costs, Repeated Games, Reward Mechanism, Miners
Subjects
Source
7th IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency, ICBC 2025
Publisher
IEEE